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A "NEW" FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: THE DECLINE OF
STATE ACTION, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, AND
SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS UNDER THE
BURGER COURT
DAVID F. SCHWARTZ*
Headlines and great national debate greeted Warren Court deci-
sions in areas such as race relations, legislative apportionment, and the
rights of nonracial minorities. However, beneath the spotlight focusing
on substantive questions, there existed a more significant procedural
orientation toward providing certain interests with extraordinary judi-
cial protection from hostile governmental action. In the broad areas of
state action, fundamental rights, and suspect classifications, this orien-
tation resulted in significant limits on state power.
During the 1970's, the Burger Court' demonstrated unmistakable
hostility to what had become the traditional legal views in those three
areas and thus severely eroded many limitations on state power. With
Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,2 the Court moved substantially away from
what had been a constantly expanding view of state action. Holt Civic
Club v. City of Tuscaloosa3 completed a massive retreat from the doc-
trine of fundamental rights. In Foley v. Connelie4 and Ambach v.
Norwick,5 the Court indicated that there was little vitality remaining in
the concept of suspect classifications.
These decisions suggest that a radically different interpretation of
the fourteenth amendment has emerged during the 1970's. This article
will discuss the "new" state action as developed by the Supreme Court,
the doctrine of fundamental rights, and suspect classifications. It will
* Assistant Professor of Government and Public Affairs at Southern Illinois University,
Edwardsville, Illinois. B.A., State University of New York at Albany; M.A., Ph.D., Pennsylvania
State University. The author wishes to express appreciation to the Graduate School of Southern
Illinois University-Edwardsville for a research grant for the completion of this article.
1. The "Burger Court" characterization refers to the tenure of Chief Justice Warren Burger,
which began in 1969 when Warren Burger replaced Earl Warren. In 1970, Harry A. Blackmun
replaced Abe Fortas; in 1972, Lewis Powell and William H. Rehnquist replaced Hugo Black and
John M. Harlan, respectively. John Paul Stevens replaced William O. Douglas in 1976. These
five joined holdovers William J. Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Byron White, and Potter Stewart
to form the Burger Court.
2. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
3. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
4. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
5. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
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be shown that the Supreme Court has seriously impaired these three
important mechanisms designed to protect civil rights.
STATE ACTION
Retreat from the Civil Rights Cases. The 'New" State Action
One of the more fascinating chapters in American constitutional
law has been the Supreme Court's effort to release the fourteenth
amendment from the confines of the Civil Rights Cases.6 That deci-
sion's rather stark public-private dichotomy 7 seemed to limit the
amendment's application to situations in which a state was foolish
enough to openly deny due process and equal protection. This meant
that when states, whether for reasons of conscience or guile, began to
curtail discriminatory activity, the private sector was both willing and
constitutionally able to fill the void.8 There seemed to be no reason
why a state could not simply delegate to private parties any activity it
wished to immunize from federal scrutiny. As long as private discrimi-
nation remained immune from federal due process and equal protec-
tion requirements, the fourteenth amendment was at best marginally
relevant to the most consequential invidious discriminations.
Judicial hostility to this "silver platter" concept of state neutrality
or inaction 9 surfaced as early as the 1940's. Although it was unwilling
to overrule the Civil Rights Cases, the Court revitalized the fourteenth
6. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
7. The Court invalidated the public accommodations sections of the Civil Rights Act of
1875, ch. 114, § 5, 18 Stat. 337 (1875) (repealed 1948), reasoning that since the fourteenth amend-
ment refers directly to the states, congressional power to enforce the amendment could reach state
but not private action.
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment ...
[The fourteenth amendment] does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal
law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the oper-
ation of State laws . . . when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified.
109 U.S. at 11.
8. Compare, e.g., the Texas white primary cases of Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927)
(state law limiting primary election participation to whites is denial of equal protection) and
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (state authorization to political party's executive committee
to prescribe primary election eligibility requirements is state action when committee limits pri-
mary voting to whites) with Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (state party convention
resolution limiting primary election participation to whites not state action since political party is
private group not amenable to fourteenth amendment restrictions). Grovey was later overruled by
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
9. Purposeful state noninvolvement designed to allow others to do what the state cannot
constitutionally do is reminiscent of the silver platter doctrine in search and seizure law. This
notion allowed federal officials to nominally stay within the Court's exclusionary rule, see Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), by turning over unconstitutionally seized evidence to state
officials on a "silver platter" for use in state court. The Court closed this loophole in 1961, see
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), much as Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), began to
close the state neutrality/inaction loophole.
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amendment by expanding the definition of state action very nearly to
the point suggested by Justice Harlan's dissent in the Civil Rights
Cases. ' 0 Thus, private conduct could be brought within the fourteenth
amendment if even a trace of a symbiotic relationship existed between
private actors and the state.
With Smith v. Allwright," Marsh v. Alabama,'2 and Shelley v.
Kramer,'3 the public-private dichotomy so crucial to the Civil Rights
Cases began to blur. In each of these cases, the Court found that the
conduct of ostensibly private individuals and the use of facially neutral
state power was proscribed by the fourteenth amendment when the
conduct or power placed the state on the side of those who denied due
process or equal protection.
While these early decisions established definite movement away
from the holding in the Civil Rights Cases, the Warren Court's role is
still noteworthy. Such decisions as Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority,14 Evans v. Newton,' 5 Reitman v. Mulkey, 16 and Amalgamated
10. "In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of the fourteenth amend-
ment, railroad corporations, keepers of inns, and managers of places of public amusement are
agents of the state, because they. . . are amenable, in respect of their public duties and functions,
to government regulation." 109 U.S. at 58-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). In this case, and later in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), the
Court held that when a state in the past has controlled primary elections and the primary election
is a vital part of the electoral process in that state, the conduct of that primary election involved
state action even where there was no overt or direct state action.
12. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). The Court invalidated the trespass conviction of a Jehovah's Wit-
ness for distributing religious literature in a company-owned town. Id. at 17-18. While a state
could permit private individuals or entities to own and control municipalities, and while the state's
general police power to punish trespassing was acknowledged, the state could not use its facially
neutral power to punish those who asserted first amendment rights in company towns. Like the
elections in Terry and Allwright, control of municipalities remained a state function regardless of a
state's internal policies so that the private supervisors are under the same fourteenth amendment
constraints as the state would have been. See note II supra.
13. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Here, the Court held that when property owners entered into racially
restrictive covenants, this was precisely the type of private conduct that the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883), held was immune to fourteenth amendment restrictions. However, when the prop-
erty owners sought to enforce the terms of the covenant in state courts, and when the state courts
vindicated the discriminators, the state then became a partner in racial discrimination, which the
fourteenth amendment prohibits. Shelley raised an interesting philosophical question that was
never really resolved: If private individuals may discriminate as invidiously as they wish, and if
the state may tolerate but not assist in the discriminatory conduct, is it a logical outgrowth of this
situation that individuals must resort to self-help in vindicating their right to discriminate? The
passage of title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see note 20 infra, to a large extent mooted this
question. But see the debate between Justices Black and Douglas in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
226 (1964).
14. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). The Court found that a forbidden symbiotic relationship existed
between a private actor and the state. Since the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, which served only whites,
derived great benefit to its business from renting space in the municipal parking garage, and since
the state derived benefit from its association with Eagle, defraying expenses by leasing space to the
coffee shop, Eagle's discrimination became Delaware's policy for fourteenth amendment pur-
poses.
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Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza17 not only embraced but
represented the apex of the new state action. By 1968, virtually every
conceivable private activity could be linked, however tenuously, with
the state and thus brought within the fourteenth amendment's scope.
While no doubt a distortion of the constitutional system envi-
sioned in the Civil Rights Cases,'8 the new state action filled a void in
federal civil rights protection which had existed since 1883. However,
two subsequent developments seemed likely to either halt any further
expansion of the state action doctrine or to foreshadow a rollback of
judicial activism in cases where the links between private conduct and
the state were the most tenuous. Paradoxically, the first development
preceded the new state action when the Supreme Court, in the 1930's,
acceded to the massive expansion of national power under the com-
merce clause.' 9 However, it was not until passage of the Civil Rights
Acts of 196420 and 196821 that Congress fully used its power to remove
15. 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (Evans I). In Evans I, a will conveyed land to the city for use as a
park for whites only. Apparently realizing the state action implications, city officials resigned as
trustees and state courts appointed private citizens to carry out the will. The Court held that the
act of appointing trustees was forbidden state action, since the park had become an integral part of
city life, so that the city was involved in its operation regardless of the nominal trustees. But see
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (Evans 11), where, on remand of Evans I, the Georgia courts
held that the land conveyance must fail because its racially discriminatory provisions could not be
carried out without forbidden state action. Therefore, the land reverted to the estate. The Court
permitted the conveyance to fail, refusing to accept the argument that state court involvement in a
reversion necessitated by racial discrimination made the state a partner in the discrimination.
16. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). This case probably represents the furthest erosion of the CivilRights
Cases. The Court struck down an amendment to the California Constitution repealing the state's
fair housing laws. While purporting to acknowledge that states were under no federal obligation
to pass fair housing laws and that states were generally free to repeal laws they thought unwise,
the Court nevertheless held the repeal here tantamount to an affirmative state authorization for
housing discrimination.
17. 391 U.S. 308 (1968). As in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the Court found the
shopping center to be an essentially public place and voided an injunction designed to prevent
picketing there. While the state could permit private individuals to own and control public areas,
the state could not vindicate the private owner's desire to restrict the first amendment freedoms of
those to whom the mall was otherwise open.
18. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In these cases, the Court redefined
the concept of "direct effect" and held that the commerce power extended to local activities far
removed from interstate commerce when those activities had a substantial or potentially substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce. See also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), in which
the Court held that the movement of people as well as commodities across state lines was subject
to the commerce power. This meant that Congress could remove impediments to travel, such as
discrimination in public accommodations, whether or not a state was involved.
20. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1976)). The most impor-
tant provisions of the act are titles II and VII, which prohibit discrimination in places of public
accommodation and in employment, respectively. In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964), the Court upheld title II as a permissible exercise of the commerce power. Con-
gress thus was able to accomplish in 1964 almost precisely what it could not accomplish in 1875,
see note 7 supra, despite the absence of any relevant constitutional change.
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barriers to the free flow of interstate commerce as a means to reach
discriminatory private action. This new commerce power appeared to
render the new state action a more circuitous and largely superfluous
method of dealing with private discrimination. Since Congress had
taken the initiative, there was no longer the pressing need for judicial
innovation which had existed in the 1940's.22
The second development was the change in the Supreme Court's
membership after 1969. The Burger Court, arguably more sympathetic
to state governmental power than to minority claims for added judicial
protection, seemed unlikely to expand or even to perpetuate the new
state action. Thus, the equation combining judicial restraint with the
possibility for congressional activism in the civil rights area yielded a
dubious prognosis for the new state action's vitality.
Flagg Brothers v. Brooks and the "Mere Acquiescence" Doctrine
The transition to the Burger Court did not result in outright rejec-
tion of the new state action. However, beginning in 1972 and reaching
a climax in Flagg Brothers v. Brooks23 in 1978, the Court's decisions
represent an unmistakable and nearly total rejection of the new state
action, eroding most of the Warren Court's activism in this area.
In Moose Lodge v. Irvis,2 4 the Court held that a private club's ra-
cially motivated refusal to serve a member's guest was not transmuted
to forbidden state action because the club possessed a liquor license. In
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,25 the Court decided that a privately-owned
shopping mall's refusal to allow the distribution of antiwar leaflets re-
tained the cloak of private conduct despite the general public's access
to the mall. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. ,26 the Court found,
despite the state's massive regulatory involvement, that a utility's termi-
nation of service without notice or opportunity to be heard was not
state action.
While purporting to distinguish rather than overrule the expansive
21. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976)). The Act of 1968
deals in part with discrimination in the sale or rental of housing and other property.
22. Under the "new" commerce power, Congress could directly regulate private conduct
without the need to link private conduct with the state through judicial acrobatics, although con-
gressional as well as judicial acrobatics were often needed to link private activity with interstate
commerce. To the extent that a private activity could not be linked with interstate commerce,
which was virtually unimaginable after 1941, or if Congress did not choose to deal with a certain
type of discrimination, the new state action could still be useful.
23. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
24. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
25. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
26. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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state action cases,27 the Court's emphasis and direction in these three
decisions was clear. Despite the Court's contrary assertion,28 the pres-
ence of a symbiotic relationship between the club and the state in Irvis
was even more pronounced than that in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Aut~hority;29Lloyd seemed to ignore the entire public access concept on
which Marsh v. Alabama30 was based; and Jackson suggested a public-
private dichotomy so extreme that one would be hardpressed to find
anything that was truly state action.31 Regardless whether the Court
was motivated by a desire to restore a more meaningful balance be-
27. There was, however, one casualty: Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Val-
ley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), was soon distinguished out of existence. See note 30 infra.
28. According to the Court, in Moose Lodge "there is nothing approaching the symbiotic
relationship between lessor and lessee that was present in Burton. . . . In short, while Eagle was a
public restaurant in a public building, Moose Lodge is a private social club in a private building."
407 U.S. at 175. This is a most bizarre statement; the first part seems clearly wrong, the second
plainly irrelevant. Certainly, an integral part of Moose Lodge's attractiveness as a private club
was its possession of a liquor license, and the lodge hence derived great benefit from its relation-
ship with the state. Moreover, the pervasiveness of liquor license regulation intertwines the state
and licensee to a far greater extent than does the lease of space in a municipal building, as in
Burton, which requires little more than minimal landlord-tenant dealings. Thus, the Court was
correct in holding that Moose Lodge was distinguishable from Burton, but the distinction is that
there was more, not less, state involvement in the former than in the latter. The Court supposedly
did not consider the packaging in which the state's involvement was couched in Smith v. Allw-
right, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Thus, where an activity occurred, in a public or private building,
cannot be dispositive of the fourteenth amendment's applicability.
29. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
30. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). The basis for Marsh was that a state cannot escape constitutional
involvement when it allows private individuals to open property to the public while refusing to
recognize constitutional rights the public normally enjoys. See note 12 supra. However, this is
precisely what the Court sanctioned in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). The conten-
tion that "the owner of the company town [in Marsh] was performing the full spectrum of munici-
pal power and stood in the shoes of the State [whereas in Lloya] there is no comparable
assumption. . . of municipal functions or power," id. at 569, exalts form over substance. Clearly,
Lloyd Corp. was never under any obligation to open its property to the public. Once the property
was opened, however, Marsh means that the state cannot vindicate the owner's reluctance to toler-
ate the public's exercise of first amendment freedoms.
The attempt in Lloyd to distinguish Logan Valley Plaza would have been more honest had
the Court overruled Marsh. However, in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), the Court in-
stead opted to overrule Logan Valley Plaza while allegedly leaving Marsh intact. Hudgens held
that fourteenth amendment restrictions apply only where private property is used in such a way as
to become "the functional equivalent of a municipality." Id. at 520. This logic does little more
than limit Marsh to its facts, leaving it virtually devoid of substance.
31. Jackson introduced two elements which would further erode the new state action. First
was the concept of exclusive sovereign prerogatives. Since states, for the most part, are not entre-
preneurs in the utility business, that business is not an exclusive prerogative. Thus, a state is not
necessarily implicated when the utility company it has authorized to operate and whose operations
it directs acts in a manner in which the state itself could not constitutionally act. Closely related to
this notion of exclusivity is the concept of mere acquiescence. This means that as long as the state
does not require a private company to act in a manner in which the state could not, the state's
approval of that action is constitutionally irrelevant. In Jackson, since it was the company's idea
to terminate service without notice or opportunity to be heard, the state's approval "does not
transmute a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the commission into 'state action.'"
419 U.S. at 357. The exclusive prerogative and mere acquiescence doctrines of Jackson played a
key role in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). See text accompanying notes 42-61 infra.
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tween things public and things private, hostility to the specific interests
seeking protection, or a posture of judicial restraint that looks to Con-
gress to remedy deprivations of rights, Irvis, Lloyd, and Jackson were
as much a return to the Civil Rights Cases32 as Burton,33 Evans,34 Reit-
man,35 and Logan Valley Plaza36 were a retreat.
The apex of the new state action's demise came in the area of debt-
ors' and creditors' rights, paradoxical in that the Court's initial deci-
sions were sympathetic to the debtor insofar as maximizing procedural
protection. Thus, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,37 Fuentes v.
Shevin, 38 Mitchell v. WT Grant Co., 3 9 and North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,40 although sharply divided over the sufficiency of
various notice and hearing schemes, the Court never questioned the
applicability of the due process clause to these private disputes. 41
However, in Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,42 where the state at least
nominally opted out of one phase of debtor-creditor relations, the ta-
bles turned dramatically. New York permitted warehouse owners to
sell stored goods in order to satisfy delinquent storage fees. The statute
required no opportunity to be heard by the debtor and Flagg Brothers
did no more than inform Brooks by mail that her possessions would be
sold if payment was not made. Brooks complained that she was being
overcharged; however, the law provided no remedy other than re-
plevin, which required posting a surety bond that she could not afford.
Brooks argued that the statutory authorization to sell without the need
for a hearing was a denial of due process. 43
In a five to three decision, the Court upheld the New York law.
The Court's reasoning relied heavily on the Jackson notions of exclu-
sive prerogatives and mere acquiescence," but the decision was essen-
32. 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see discussion in text at notes 6-8 supra.
33. See note 14 supra.
34. See note 15 supra.
35. See note 16 supra.
36. See note 17 supra.
37. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
38. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
39. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
40. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
41. The key issue in each of the four cases was at what stage in proceedings to freeze wages
or repossess property the debtor was constitutionally assured of an opportunity to be heard.
42. 436 U.S. 149 (1978). As the Court noted: "The constitutional protection attaches not
because, as in North Georgia Finishing, a clerk issued a ministerial writ. . . but because as a result
of that writ the property of the debtor was seized and impounded by the affirmative command of
the law of Georgia." Id. at 160-61 n.10. As in Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), a state is not
permitted to use its power to vindicate the rights of those who would deny due process.
43. 436 U.S. at 153.
44. Brooks had been evicted from her apartment and had placed her possessions in storage.
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tially based on one crucial premise: The warehouse owner's sale of the
goods did not involve any action by the state. Hence there was no four-
teenth amendment violation. While admitting that the contemplated
sale of goods was normally executed by the sheriff, the Court held that
only exclusive prerogatives of sovereignty such as conducting elections
or supervising municipalities were so committed to the state that they
remained state functions even when delegated to private individuals.
Selling stored goods was held not an exclusive prerogative of sover-
eignty, so the state could abdicate responsibility. In the Court's view,
the decision did nothing more than recognize "the traditional place of
private arrangements in ordering relationships in the commercial
world. '45 The state's mere acquiescence in conduct which would have
been unconstitutional if done by the state was not state action, but'
rather inaction:
Indeed, the crux of respondents' complaint is not that the State has
acted, but that it has refused to act. This statutory refusal to act is no
different in principle from an ordinary statute of limitations whereby
the State declines to provide a remedy for private deprivations of
property after the passage of a given period of time.46
Little remains of the new state action after Flagg Brothers, and the
Court's reasoning is assailable on several grounds. First, it is neither
logically nor legally accurate to define state involvement in facially pri-
vate activity in terms of the activity's exclusivity. Exclusivity is an es-
sentially meaningless description of power. Technically, there are
aspects of its power that a state may not delegate;47 however, for all
practical purposes, a state may give away anything under the proviso
that for federal constitutional purposes the state retains responsibility
New York authorized the warehouse owner to sell the goods, after notification, in a commercially
reasonable manner and endeavored to define commercially reasonable. Brooks responded to the
notice of the warehouse's intent to sell by filing suit in federal court to recover damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), which depends upon state action. The district court dismissed the suit, hold-
ing that under Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the warehouse owner's
action was not state action. The court of appeals reversed, finding that, even under Jackson,
functions normally associated with the state such as the contemplated sale of goods (even though
formerly done by the sheriff) remained state functions when delegated to others.
45. 436 U.S. at 160.
46. Id. at 166 (emphasis in original). "This Court ... has never held that a State's mere
acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that of the State. . . . [T]he State of
New York is in no way responsible for Flagg Brothers' decision, a decision which the State .
permits but does not compel. ... .Id. at 164-65.
47. For example, the Court has held that a state is not constitutionally able to contract away
its eminent domain or police powers, see Pennsylvania Hosp. v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917)
and Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880), respectively. These cases illustrate that the notions
of exclusivity and delegation are largely meaningless since, in each case, the state actually dele-
gated the non-delegatable power. The proper principle is that the state can reclaim certain of its
powers and nullify effects of the delegation. The same would be true if the state were to delegate
its so-called exclusive powers of conducting elections and supervising municipalities.
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for the conduct of functions delegated to private parties. It makes little
sense to cite Marsh and Allwright as illustrative of the exclusivity prin-
ciple, as the majority does in Flagg Brothers.48 In both of those cases,
the Court sanctioned the delegation of power over elections and munic-
ipalities while holding the state responsible for the manner in which the
power was exercised. If it is permissible to delegate a power, it is
hardly logical to characterize the delegated power as exclusive.
Second, after Flagg Brothers, it is difficult to imagine what consti-
tutes an exclusive function, other than conducting elections and super-
vising municipalities. It could be argued that providing security
against the forcible transfer of property is a function that is at the core
of a state's existence.49 By allowing New York to evade responsibility
for the private action in Flagg Brothers, the Court trivialized those
functions it proclaimed to be exclusive. There is no point in strictly
scrutinizing the conduct of elections and the supervision of municipali-
ties if the officials chosen at those elections and the officials who super-
vise the municipalities are permitted to simply delegate the
preservation of order in the community to unaccountable private indi-
viduals. To argue that New York's decision is an example of democ-
racy and federalism at work misses the point that the fourteenth
amendment was designed to remove various policy options from the
states.
Third, any definition of state action that equates the absence of
overt involvement with the absence of a fourteenth amendment ques-
tion permits precisely what Allwright sought to prohibit: purposeful
state non-involvement designed to immunize a particular activity from
fourteenth amendment challenge. 50 The majority had no satisfactory
48. 436 U.S. at 158-59. The Court argued that while the Texas primary was the only mean-
ingful election and the Chickasaw streets were the only streets, the analogy was not applicable to
Brooks, since she was not doomed to have her property sold. Rather, she could resort to New
York's replevin procedure, which required posting a surety bond. Possession of a cash reserve for
such exigencies, however, is not normally associated with the victims of eviction and forced sale of
goods. Thus, replevin was no remedy for Brooks at all.
49. "The power to order legally binding surrenders of property and the constitutional restric-
tions on that power are necessary correlatives in our system.. In effect, today's decision allows the
State to divorce these two elements by the simple expedient of transferring the implementation of
its policy to private parties." Id. at 178-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). That the state might be for-
ever implicated in property transfers of this kind simply because it had once elected to supervise
them may sound harsh, but it is the exact principle established in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967).
50. See note I I supra. The Court maintained that the "total absence of overt official involve-
ment plainly distinguishes this case from earlier decisions .... " 436 U.S. at 157. Such a state-
ment is a triumph of form over substance. The Court admitted that state action is more than a
mechanical or ministerial concept of literal involvement in a controversy by someone who works
for the government; rather, state action is to be viewed in terms of where the power and prestige of
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response to the charge that, given its logic in Flagg Brothers, it was not
evident that a state could not "authorize the warehouseman to retain
all proceeds of the lien sale even if they far exceed the amount of the
alleged debt. . . authorize finance companies to enter private homes to
repossess merchandise . . . [or] authorize 'any person with sufficient
physical power' to acquire and sell the property of his weaker neigh-
bor." t51 While it may be tempting to argue that such direct authoriza-
tion as in those examples would clearly constitute state action, it should
be noted that the scheme upheld in Flagg Brothers emanated from di-
rect legislative authorization to the warehouse owner.5
2
Finally, the existence of a symbiotic relationship between private
conduct and the state, which had been the sine qua non of the new state
action, was curiously ignored by the Court in Flagg Brothers. In the
same fashion as did the restaurant in Burton,53 the warehouse in Flagg
Brothers derived great benefit from New York's abdication, enabling
the company to "free up its valuable storage space" 54 without regard to
the bothersome legal procedures seemingly mandated by Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.,55 Fuentes v. Shevin,56 Mitchell v. WT Grant
the state is placed. See note 42 supra. Yet, in Flagg Bros., precisely as in the debtors' rights cases,
see notes 37-41 supra and accompanying text, the power of the state was clearly placed in support
of those who would deny due process.
51. 436 U.S. at 170 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
An attempt to challenge the validity of any such outrageous statute would be defeated by
the reasoning the Court uses today: The Court's rationale would characterize action
pursuant to such a statute as purely private action, which the State permits but does not
compel, in an area not exclusively reserved to the State.
Id.
The Court responded: "Unlike the parade of horribles suggested by... [the] dissent...
this case does not involve state authorization of private breach of the peace." Id. at 160 n.9.
However, Rlagg Bros. involved state authorization of private denials of due process, as did the
Stevens examples.
52. Whether termed "traditional," "exclusive," or "significant," the state power to order
binding, nonconsensual resolution of a conflict between debtor and creditor is exactly the
sort of power with which the Due Process Clause is concerned. And the State's delega-
tion of that power to a private party is, accordingly, subject to due process scrutiny ....
The focus is not on the private deprivation but on the state authorization. . . .The
State's conduct in this case takes the concrete form of a statutory enactment, and it is that
statute that may be challenged.
Id. at 176 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. See notes 14 and 29 supra.
54. 436 U.S. at 162 n.12. This rather casual remark appeared in the majority opinion. In-
credibly, the Court mentioned in the same footnote that "New York's statute has done nothing
more than authorize ...what Flagg Brothers would tend to do, even in the absence of such
authorization. ... Id. This statement ignored the fact that Flagg Brothers' tendency would be
illegal without express state authorization. The fact that common law might have recognized the
warehouse owner's right to sell under certain delinquency circumstances is irrelevant insofar as
the due process clause is concerned. However, the Court then proceeded to make the due process
clause irrelevant!
55. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
56. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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Co., 57 and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.58 Indeed,
Flagg Brothers rendered those debtors' rights cases largely irrelevant,
since a state now would be foolish to expose its commercial practices to
federal scrutiny when withdrawal from the field in favor of private ac-
tion is perfectly permissible. 59
Flagg Brothers made clear that the state action doctrine had
changed dramatically in only ten years, even though only one case was
overruled.60 At this time, it would not be warranted to say that the
Court has returned to its stance in 1883. However, it is evident that
there is now a new new state action, which has rolled back what the
Burger Court obviously considers to be excessive restraints on state
power. Whether the new orientation in this area is wise presents a nor-
mative question. However, to the extent that a state is not responsible
for what might be unjustified property transfers or can fulfill its respon-
sibility by providing only a post-hoc procedure that might not be a via-
ble remedy for the victim, Justice Marshall's accusation that Flagg
Brothers shows "an attitude of callous indifference to the realities of
life for the poor"6' is difficult to refute.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The doctrine of fundamental rights, like the new state action, re-
duced state power by creating a category of interests and activities
which was virtually immune to governmental infringement. Similar to
its strategy in the state action area, the Burger Court first moved to
57. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
58. 419 U.S. 601 (1975). Since the majority in Flagg Bros. found no state action, it correctly
did not inquire into whether New York's procedure would have been sufficient under the due
process clause had there been state action. The dissent assumed "arguendo, that the procedure to
be followed would be inadequate if the sale were conducted by state officials. ... 436 U.S. at
169 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Under the debtors' rights cases, the absence of a pre-sale hearing
almost certainly would have been fatal to New York's law had a due process inquiry been
reached.
59. [T]he very defect that made the statutes in Shepin and North Georgia Finishing un-
constitutional-lack of state control-is, under today's decision, the factor that precludes
constitutional review of the state statute. The Due Process Clause cannot command such
incongruous results. If it is unconstitutional for a State to allow a private party to exer-
cise a traditional state power because the state supervision of that power is purely
mechanical, the State surely cannot immunize its actions from constitutional scrutiny by
removing even the mechanical supervision ...
Not only has the State removed its nominal supervision in this case, it has also
authorized a private party to exercise a governmental power that is at least as significant
as the power exercised in Sheyin or North Georgia Finishing.
436 U.S. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
60. See note 30 supra. The Court's heavy reliance in Flagg Bros. on Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), and Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), is revealing, since
those cases departed so extremely from the pre-1970 state action decisions.
61. 436 U.S. at 166 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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contain any expansion of the list of fundamental rights and has now
begun to dismantle the fundamental rights concept.
Important Rights and Two- Tiered Scrutiny
As with state action, the Warren Court is sometimes incorrectly
perceived as the architect of both the fundamental rights doctrine and
its attendant strict judicial scrutiny. While it is clear that the Warren
Court embraced and expanded the doctrine, the notion of a hierarchy
of rights entitled to extraordinary judicial protection predated the War-
ren Court. The footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co. 6 2
suggested that there existed an implicit constitutional recognition that
some rights were more important than others and that different levels
of analysis were appropriate depending on what rights were involved. 63
In Kovacs v. Cooper,64 the Court acknowledged that first amendment
freedoms occupied a preferred status, and in Skinner v. Oklahoma,65
the Court labeled procreation fundamental.
While terminology often varies 66 and disputes frequently arise,
the Warren Court arguably elevated education,67 voting,68 marriage, 69
62. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
63. There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitu-
tion, such as those of the first ten amendments. . . . It is unnecessary to consider now
whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be ex-
pected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exact-
ing judicial scrutiny ...
Id. at 152-53 n.4.
64. 336 U.S. 77 (1949). While this acknowledgement was made in a plurality opinion, id. at
88, three dissenters, Justices Black, Douglas, and Rutledge, seemed to accept the preferred notion
but disputed the way in which it was applied. Thus, a clear majority accepted the doctrine.
65. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race. . . . [SItrict scrutiny of the classification a State makes in a sterilization law is
essential, lest unwittingly or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made ...
Id. at 541.
66. Unfortunately, the Court has never been very systematic with regard to adjectives used to
modify things fundamental and things not fundamental. Thus, words such as "important," "sub-
stantial," "significant," and "overriding" are often used interchangeably but sometimes trigger
different standards of review.
67. In Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court did not use the word "funda-
mental." Yet, given the opinion's characterization of education, it would be difficult to arrive at a
conclusion other than that education became a fundamental right, at least when the state elects to
provide it at all:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities. . . . It is the
very foundation of good citizenship. . . . In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Id. at 493.
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marital privacy,70 and interstate travel7' to fundamental status. The
label is much more than a semantic exercise. Courts normally presume
that governmental actions are constitutional. 72 This presumption
places on the challenger the burden of proving either that the govern-
ment does not possess a legitimate interest in the action it has taken or
that the action is not a rational method of fulfilling that interest.73
However, when government infringes a right the Court has labeled fun-
damental, the burden of proof shifts. Government must then prove
that the infringement is motivated by a compelling interest 74 that can-
not be achieved without infringing that fundamental right. 75 While
this strict judicial scrutiny does not require that every intrusion on a
fundamental right be held unconstitutional, significantly, "the Warren
Court never found a state measure sufficiently compelling to override
anything it deemed fundamental. ' ' 76 As the list of fundamental rights
68. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court held that to the extent a state con-
ducts elections, "the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society
[and] is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, [so that] any alleged infringement...
[must] be carefully and meticulously scrutinized." Id. at 561-62.
69. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). "Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of
man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival." Id. at 12.
70. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), a plurality found "the right of privacy in
marriage" to be "basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society." Id. at 491 (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
71. "This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitu-
tional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the
length and breadth of our land uninhibited. ... Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629
(1969).
72. "[Rlegulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pro-
nounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of
such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 (1938).
73. This type of inquiry is known as minimal scrutiny, and it is as difficult for a law to be
invalid under minimal scrutiny as it is for a law to be valid under strict scrutiny. See note 75
infra. "Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not
courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation. . . .The doctrine that. . . due process
authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted un-
wisely ...has long since been discarded." Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963).
74. Alternatively, the intensity of the government's interest is referred to as "important,"
"substantial," "significant," or "over-riding." See note 66 supra.
75. Under this alternative means criterion, while pursuing its compelling interest, "the State
cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity."
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
76. Mendelson, From Warren to Burger- The Rise and Decline of Substantive Equal Protec-
tion, 66 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1226, 1227 (1972). Mendelson's assertion is somewhat overstated. In
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court held that the maintenance of an orderly
selective service system was compelling and that an individual's possession of his registration cer-
tificate was necessary to fulfill this interest, so that the government could punish an individual for
destroying the certificate even though such punishment infringed upon symbolic speech. See text
accompanying note 64 supra. Nevertheless, the statement is an accurate reflection of the Warren
Court's overall posture in this area.
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grew, state power correspondingly declined-an equation that summa-
rizes the trend under the Warren Court.
The "'Implicit/Explicit Protection" Doctrine
As with the new state action, the Burger Court's hostility to the
fundamental rights doctrine soon became apparent. In Dandridge v.
Williams,7 7 the Court pointedly asserted that "state regulation in the
social and economic field, not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights' 78 is to be judged under the more lenient rational basis stan-
dard.79 Dandridge's significance is two-fold. First, the aid plan the
Court approved could have a drastic effect on a large family's survival,
a circumstance that makes welfare at least seem fundamental. 80 The
decision to apply minimal scrutiny therefore suggests a desire to avoid
extending the fundamental rights doctrine to an arguably logical candi-
date for fundamental status. Second, and even more significant, Dan-
dridge suggests that in order to be fundamental, a right must be
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 81 While the decision sanctioned the
existence of the fundamental rights doctrine, the seemingly requisite
Bill of Rights linkage would virtually erase every fundamental right
that previously had been "discovered. '82
However, the decisions in Boddie v. Connecticut83 and Dunn v.
Blumstein84 demonstrated the Court's willingness to tolerate the status
quo in the fundamental rights area. In Boddie, the Court held that
access to a divorce court regardless of ability to pay costs and fees was
either itself a fundamental right or a necessary concomitant of the fun-
damental right of marriage.85 In Dunn, the Court invalidated lengthy
77. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
78. Id. at 484. This statement indicates both that minimal scrutiny will be used and that
welfare is not a fundamental right. See notes 73-75 supra.
79. Id.
80. The challenged state law placed an upper limit on the total amount of aid a family could
receive. Curiously, in the same year, the Court also decided Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970), holding that due process required a pretermination hearing for welfare recipients because
"welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care ...
[Tiermination of aid. . . may deprive. . . the very means by which to live .... " Id. at 264. If
a governmental policy that affects the ability to live does not merit strict scrutiny, it is difficult to
make a rational argument for what should be strictly scrutinized.
81. See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
82. Freedom of speech would continue to be fundamental under this definition, see note 64
supra, but none of the others in notes 67-71 supra would be. However, the Court soon found a
loophole, see text accompanying note 90 infra, that for a while kept the Warren Court's list intact.
83. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
84. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
85. Language in the opinion supports either position:
[Miarriage involves interests of basic importance in our society. . . . Without a priorjudicial imprimatur, individuals may freely enter into and rescind commercial contracts,
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residency requirements which exerted a chilling effect on the funda-
mental rights of voting and interstate travel. 86 In its early stages, then,
it appeared that while the Burger Court was adamantly opposed to ex-
panding the list of fundamental rights, it was not inclined to pare the
list that existed. 87
The key decision of San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez88 suggested that this tolerance of the status quo was short-
lived. In upholding Texas' school finance method, the Court adopted,
with a slight modification, the fundamental rights definition suggested
in Dandridge:89 An activity's social importance alone is irrelevant in
determining whether a right is fundamental. Rather, the rights entitled
to the extraordinary protection of strict judicial scrutiny are those ex-
plicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.90 "Education, of
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under [the]
Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so
protected."9 1 This meant that a state's policy of financing education
had to survive only minimal scrutiny. 92 In order to avoid the ines-
for example, but we are unaware of any jurisdiction where private citizens may covenant
for or dissolve marriages without state approval. . . .[Diue process requires, at a mini-
mum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced
to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.
401 U.S. at 376-77.
86. The Court accepted as compelling the state's goal of limiting the franchise to bona fide
residents. But the Court held that making one year the benchmark for bona fide residency and for
the assumption of minimal familiarity with local issues was "much too crude" since there were
less intrusive ways of determining bona fide residency and since duration was at best only margin-
ally related to familiarity. 405 U.S. at 359.
87. In various forms, the Court recognized the existence of fundamental rights in Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), each of
which invalidated laws that did not minimize state interference with marital and family decisions,
and in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), each
of which invalidated state laws that infringed first amendment freedoms without a compelling
state interest.
88. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
89. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
90. 411 U.S. at 33-34.
91. Id. at 35.
92. "A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirma-
tively supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the
State's system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes." Id. at 40.
While some benefited more than others under the Texas plan, since "the thrust of the Texas sys-
tem is affLirmative and reformatory. . . , [it] should be scrutinized under judicial principles sensi-
tive to the nature of the State's efforts and to the rights reserved to the States under the
Constitution." Id. at 39. The district court had not only held that education was a fundamental
right, but had also asserted that the Texas system, which resulted in higher per student expendi-
tures in wealthy districts than in poor districts, used wealth as a suspect classification. See note
131 infra. The Court rejected both holdings, but its deference to the state in the field of education
is strange in light of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
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capable impression that Skinner v. Oklahoma,93 Reynolds v. Sims, 94
and Shapiro v. Thompson95 had been overruled, the Court simply con-
cluded that procreation, voting, and interstate travel were protected im-
plicitly by the Constitution and therefore were entitled to retain
fundamental status.96
Prior to Dandridge and Rodriguez, the Court's working definition
seemed to- label as fundamental any interest or activity whose unfet-
tered enjoyment had become essential to life in American society.97
However, the dynamic concept of essentiality was rendered static in
Rodriguez when the Court defined what is essential in eighteenth cen-
tury terms. Rodriguez might be seen as laudable judicial restraint and
even as sound constitutional interpretation in that the Court rejected
the concept of the judiciary being a continuing constitutional conven-
tion whose job it is to keep rights "up to date." But it must be noted
that the Court's explicit protection doctrine finds no support other than
in Dandridge, and that its implicit protection notion is as potentially
activist as any prior definition of fundamental rights. Since education
is a significant building block for many other rights and interests, 98 the
1 (1958), wherein the Court held that education's status as a power reserved to the states did not
lessen the fourteenth amendment's impact when invidious discrimination was involved.
93. 315 U.S. 535 (1942); see note 65 supra.
94. 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see note 68 supra.
95. 394 U.S. 618 (1969); see note 71 supra.
96. The reasoning the Court supplied to support its conclusions furnished little support. For
example, "[t]he right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a right of constitutional
significance ...." 411 U.S. at 32. This statement is accurate, see Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 35 (1867), but it parallels the Court's recognition in Rodriguez of "our historic dedication to
public education," 411 U.S. at 30. If interstate travel was fundamental simply because it had
"long been recognized" as important, should not education be fundamental for the same reason?
Similarly, the Court found "constitutional underpinnings" indicating that the right to vote in state
elections is implicitly recognized, id. at 33 n.74, and that the right of procreation is protected, id. at
35 n.76. These implicitly emanated from prior court decisions. Surely Brown, which recognized
education's fundamental place, see note 67 supra, should be no less recognized than the cases the
Court cites.
97. This definition closely approximates the standard adopted for determining which of the
rights in the first eight amendments applied to the state via the fourteenth amendment. See Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). However, when the Court argued in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970), that welfare payments were essential to the very existence of the recipient, but in
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), rejected welfare as not fundamental, the definition of
a fundamental right obviously had changed. See also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), in
which the Court rejected the contention that "the 'need for decent shelter,' and the 'right to retain
peaceful possession of one's home,' are fundamental interests. . . which may be trenched upon
only after the State demonstrates some superior interest." Id. at 73.
98. See note 96 supra. Even if the Court's immediate intention was to contain the expansion
of fundamental rights, it is obvious from the analysis in Rodriguez that almost anything could be
categorized as implicitly protected:
In asserting a nexus between speech and education, appellees urge that the right to
speak is meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelli-
gently and persuasively. . . . A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect to the
right to vote .. . . We need not dispute any of these propositions.
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Court's overall hostility to the fundamental rights doctrine is obvious.
This attack on the fundamental rights doctrine intensified when, in
Kras v. United States99 and Sosna v. Iowa,'°° the Court diluted its
holdings in Boddie v. Connecticut'0' and the interstate travel cases. 02
In Kras, the Court held that conditioning access to bankruptcy court on
the ability to pay a fee did not violate the fifth amendment. 0 3 The
Court distinguished Boddie by arguing that since bankruptcy, unlike
marriage, was not a fundamental right, the fee requirement was valid
as long as it could withstand minimal scrutiny. 10 4
In Sosna, the Court held that a state could close its divorce courts
to those who had not been residents of the state for at least one year. 05
Although Iowa's requirement clearly infringed fundamental rights such
as interstate travel and access to the judiciary, the Court argued that
the state's interest was compelling. "With consequences of such mo-
ment [property and custody rights] riding on a divorce decree. . .[the
state] may insist that one. . . have the modicum of attachment to the
State required here."' 10 6
Both Kras and Sosna significantly vitiate Boddie. In Kras, the
Court missed the point when it argued that bankruptcy was not a fun-
damental right. 10 7 The key to Boddie, despite its confusing lan-
guage,10 8 was that a fundamental right of access to courts exists when a
411 U.S. at 35-36. See also note 67 supra.
99. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
100. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
101. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). See also note 85 supra and accompanying text.
102. See note 71 supra.
103. 409 U.S. at 446. Kras involved both due process and equal protection challenges to a
required $50 fee in order to file in federal bankruptcy court. Although the fifth amendment con-
tains no specific equal protection clause, in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Court held
that a notion of equal protection was implicit in the fifth amendment's due process clause. Id. at
449. When a right has been recognized as fundamental, the same compelling interest requirement
is applicable to federal action as to state action.
104. 409 U.S. at 443. Citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court held that
since bankruptcy legislation was in the area of economics and social welfare, the controlling stan-
dard in appraising Congress' classification is that of rational justification. Id. at 446-48. The
Court had no doubt that a congressional desire to "make the system self-sustaining" was rational.
Id.
105. 419 U.S. at 408.
106. Id. at 409. The Court contrasted Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) and Memo-
rial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the latter which held that statute requiring
one year's residence in a county to be eligible for non-emergency hospitalization or medical care
at county expense penalized the right to interstate travel without a compelling interest. In a
unique application of the fundamental rights doctrine, the Court reasoned that since marriage was
fundamental, a state's interest in opening its divorce courts to only bona fide residents must be
compelling, since divorce touches a fundamental right. This was the first time that the fundamen-
tal rights doctrine became a rationale for upholding state power. 419 U.S. at 405-09.
107. 409 U.S. at 446-47.
108. See note 85 supra.
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legal remedy is the only method of settling a dispute. 109 The Court's
use of minimal scrutiny in Kras implies that access to courts is no
longer a fundamental right.' 10
Similarly, Sosna not only sanctioned a law that denied access to
courts but also ignored the chilling effect that a lengthy residency re-
quirement had on interstate travel. While the state's interest in assur-
ing that only bona fide residents use its divorce courts arguably might
be compelling, the Court ignored the alternative means portion of the
fundamental rights doctrine. Surely there existed in Sosna the same
less intrusive means of assuring attachment to the state as the Court
suggested in Shapiro v. Thompson"'I and Dunn v. Blumstein. 112 By ig-
noring the alternative means component, the Court arguably "de-
fundamentalized" interstate travel.
Although Rodriguez, Boddie, and Dunn expressed the Court's
grudging willingness to preserve the status quo in the fundamental
rights area, Kras and Sosna began the retreat. The decision in Holt
Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa 1 3 illustrates that little of the funda-
mental rights doctrine remains at present.
Alabama law 14 automatically placed unincorporated communi-
ties that were within three miles of certain municipalities under a vari-
109. See 401 U.S. at 370.
110. Incredibly, in Kras, the Court argued that bankruptcy was not the only method open to
the bankrupt because he could meet with his creditors and negotiate a compromise. Since the
truly indigent bankrupt would be unable to negotiate such a compromise, it appears "that Con-
gress may say that some of the poor are too poor even to go bankrupt." 409 U.S. at 457 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Using this logic, the Court could have held in Boddie that indigent couples have a
remedy other than divorce: reconciliation. It is as reasonable for a state to want to make its
divorce courts self-sustaining through the payment of fees as for Congress to want to make the
bankruptcy system pay its own way by a similar method.
111. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
112. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). See also note 86 supra. The Court has generally viewed as compel-
ling a state's desire to insure bona fide residency as a prerequisite for services. Durational require-
ments per se are therefore not invalid as long as they are so narrowly drawn as to encompass both
the state's interest and the fundamental fights involved. Thus, the desire to protect against welfare
fraud and voter fraud in Shapiro and Dunn, respectively, justified the state's imposition of a rea-
sonable residency requirement. However, Iowa's interest in Sosna is not apparent. What fraud
was the state trying to prevent? Certainly, the stakes in a divorce could be high, see text accompa-
nying note 106 supra, but bona fide residency is irrelevant to a court's ability to settle financial and
custody matters. The Court's contention that a state has a compelling interest in "avoiding offi-
cious intermeddling in matters in which another State had a paramount interest, and in minimiz-
ing the susceptibility of its own divorce decrees to collateral attack," 419 U.S. at 407, ignores the
full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Iowa's decrees would have prima facie
validity if Iowa was the state of domicile, and the Court has never defined domicile solely in terms
of duration.
113. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
114. ALA. CODE. tit. 11, § 11-40-10 (1975) (police); id. tit. 12, § 12-14-1 (municipal court); id.
tit. i1, § 11-51-91 (licenses).
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ety of that municipality's "police jurisdiction" ordinances." 15 To Holt,
located within three miles of Tuscaloosa, this law meant that whatever
police, health, and licensing ordinances Tuscaloosa adopted applied
with equal force to Holt.' 1 6 Holt residents argued that, since there were
important substantive policy choices inherent in police, licensing, and
health regulations, the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment required that Alabama either allow them to
vote in Tuscaloosa elections or discontinue the extraterritoriality.
In a six to three decision, the Court upheld the Alabama scheme.
The Court's analysis of prior voting rights cases revealed a fatal flaw in
Holt's contention that it was being denied the fundamental right to
vote: In every other voting rights case, "the challenged statute . . . de-
nied the franchise to individuals who were physically resident within
the geographic boundaries of the government entity concerned."" I7
Only residents of Tuscaloosa were constitutionally entitled to vote
there. Since plaintiffs were not residents of Tuscaloosa, the state law
did not deny Holt residents anything to which they were constitution-
ally entitled. Without entitlement, no fundamental right was even in-
volved, much less abridged. Under minimal scrutiny, the Holt
plaintiffs failed to prove that extraterritoriality bore no rational rela-
tionship to any legitimate state purpose. The Court concluded that Al-
abama's scheme "was a rational legislative response to the problem
faced by the State's burgeoning cities."'"18
The Court's analysis awarded to the imaginary lines a state draws
on the map "a talismanic significance contrary to the theory and mean-
ing of. . .past voting rights cases."' 19 The Court ignored precedents
involving voting and other interests which indicated that when a fed-
115. "The police jurisdiction in cities having 6,000 or more inhabitants shall cover all adjoin-
ing territory within three miles of the corporate limits, and in cities having less than 6,000 inhabit-
ants and in towns, such police jurisdiction shall extend also to the adjoining territory within a mile
and a half...." 439 U.S. at 61 n.1.
116. More than sixty separate Tuscaloosa licensing, building, public health, traffic, criminal,
and miscellaneous ordinances applied in Holt Cipic Club. Id. at 82 n. 10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 68.
No decision of this Court has extended the 'one man, one vote' principle to individuals
residing beyond the geographic confines of the governmental entity concerned. . . .The
imaginary line defining a city's corporate limits cannot corral the influence of municipal
actions. A city's decisions inescapably affect individuals living immediately outside its
borders. . . .Yet no one would suggest that nonresidents likely to be affected. . . have
a constitutional right to participate in the political processes bringing it about.
Id. at 68-69.
118. Id. at 75. "Unincorporated communities like Holt dot the rim of most major population
centers . . . and state legislatures have a legitimate interest in seeing that this substantial segment
of the population does not go without basic municipal services. Id. at 94.
119. Id. at 81 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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eral right is involved, a state's political subdivisions are not dispositive
of constitutional questions. 20 Moreover, the Court's focus on those
imaginary lines trivialized the Holt claim. Obviously, Holt residents
did not live in Tuscaloosa nor did they claim to live there. Yet by
making residence a crucial point, the Court effectively foreclosed any
meaningful inquiry into genuine constitutional problems with Ala-
bama's system.
The proper inquiry in Holt Civic Club, which the Court reduced to
a footnote, 121 was whether, in reality, Holt residents were governed by
Tuscaloosa. Clearly, they were so governed in virtually every way
meaningful to municipal life. Once this reality is recognized, two im-
portant constitutional principles become operative. First, "government
without franchise is a fundamental violation of the due process
clause."' 122 Second, "the criterion of geographical residency . . . irra-
tionally distinguishes between two classes of citizens . ..each gov-
erned by the city of Tuscaloosa,"1 23 which is a fundamental violation of
the equal protection clause. This means that the state would have to
prove that extraterritoriality is motivated by a compelling interest that
could not be achieved other than by denying Holt residents the
franchise. However, the Court also trivialized these principles by hold-
ing that there was no constitutional violation because the important
powers of taxing and zoning were exercised by the county, where Holt
was fairly represented, and that the Alabama system was approved by
the state legislature, where Holt also was fairly represented. 124
120. "Political subdivisions of States--counties, cities, or whatever-never were and never
have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have been traditionally regarded as
subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of
state governmental functions." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964). When there are no
federal constitutional rights involved, a state's line-drawing is to be respected, Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974). When such rights are involved, political subdivisions are irrelevant. See
generally Wright v. Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
121. We do not have before us, of course, a situation in which a city has annexed outlying
territory in all but name, and is exercising the same governmental powers over residents
of surrounding unincorporated territory as it does over those residing within its corpo-
rate limits. . . .[Tuscaloosa cannot exercise over Holt] the vital and traditional authori-
ties ... to levy ad valorem taxes, invoke the power of eminent domain, and zone
property for various types of uses.
439 U.S. at 73 n.8.
122. Id. at 75.
123. Id. at 87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. With regard to the state legislature's role, the Court had rejected the view that, by an
affirmative vote, residents of a jurisdiction can waive their own constitutional right to fair repre-
sentation or those of their fellow inhabitants. Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713
(1964). With regard to the county's role, it is hard to believe that because some admittedly impor-
tant powers were being properly exercised, see note 121 supra, there was no justification for com-
plaining about those that were being improperly exercised.
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In Holt Civic Club, the Court seemed to acknowledge that voting is
a fundamental right, but then destroyed this acknowledgement by at-
tempting to demonstrate that this was simply not a voting case. Carry-
ing the Court's logic to an extent that does not seem extreme, one
wonders whether Holt Civic Club was not really a rejection of most of
the voting rights cases which the Court attempted to distinguish. For
example, would the Court now hold that residents of a malapportioned
state legislative district will not be allowed to complain about that mal-
apportionment if they are fairly represented at the county and/or mu-
nicipal levels where many, but not all, important governmental powers
are exercised? Such a hypothetical problem is not far removed from
the posture of geographic sterility to which the Court adhered.
While it is correct, as a general principle, that "a State is afforded
wide leeway when experimenting with the appropriate allocation of
state legislative power,"'' 25 this principle is supposedly reduced by the
fundamental rights doctrine. Perhaps Alabama could have proved that
assuring quality services for residents of unincorporated areas was a
compelling interest and that extraterritoriality was the method least in-
trusive on fundamental rights by which delivery of those services could
be guaranteed. But if the fundamental rights doctrine retains any
meaning, the state should have shouldered that burden of proof. The
Court's refusal to use the compelling state interest test in Holt Civic
Club means that the administrative convenience rationale that Shapiro
and Dunn rejected 126 has now become an acceptable rationale for de-
nying the franchise. Thus, voting is no longer a fundamental right.
SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS
As with state action and fundamental rights, the suspect classifica-
tion doctrine was utilized, although not invented, by the Warren
Court. t27 The doctrine emanates from, but has grown larger than, the
notion that the equal protection clause's central meaning was the pro-
tection of blacks against governmental actions motivated by racial ani-
125. 439 U.S. at 71.
126. See notes 71 and 84 supra. The Court might be showing proper respect for democracy,
see text accompanying note 124 supra, and for federalism, see text accompanying note 125 supra,
but Hol Civic Club shows little respect for stare decisis and for the fundamental rights doctrine.
127. The Warren Court's focus was on race, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(invalidating miscegenation laws); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (invalidating ra-
cially based cohabitation restrictions); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating
dual school systems). The Warren Court rejected an opportunity to elevate sex to suspect status in
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (sustaining a law that omitted women from jury lists unless
they specifically requested otherwise).
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mus. 28  While the Slaughterhouse Cases129 sought to limit the clause's
protection solely to blacks, the Court soon acknowledged that other
victims of invidious governmental discrimination would also be
heard. 130 However, race remained the only classification that was
clearly suspect.' 3' When government used a suspect classification, its
action had to survive the same strict scrutiny as when a fundamental
right was invaded.132
Aliens and the Burger Court
While fending off claims by women, illegitimate children, and the
impoverished, the Burger Court elected to come to the aid of aliens. In
Graham v. Richardson, 33 the Court held that aliens "are a prime exam-
ple of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom heightened judicial
128. This language was used in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). See also
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880): "The words of the [fourteenth] amendment, it is
true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right,
most valuable to the colored race,--the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against
them distinctively as colored. ... Id. at 307-08.
129. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
We doubt very much whether any action of a state not directed by way of discrimination
against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come
within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that
emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.
Id. at 81.
130. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the reason that the equal protection clause
applied to discriminatory enforcement of a safety law against Chinese was that enforcement
resulted in invidious discrimination against persons in similar circumstances. This factor, rather
than race per se, has become the cornerstone for adjudications under the equal protection clause.
131. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (state cannot restrict aliens
from earning a living by fishing) and Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (law restricting
land ownership and presuming that land in citizen's name but paid for by alien was held for alien
benefit denies equal protection) suggested that laws based on alienage or national origin would be
strictly scrutinized. The status of alienage as suspect, however, was not formally recognized until
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
Although suggesting that sex classifications had to pass more than mere minimal scrutiny, see
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), a majority has never
held sex to be a suspect classification. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), and San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), made clear that wealth distinctions are
not suspect. Like sex classifications, those based on illegitimacy have sometimes commanded an
intermediate standard of review, see NJWRO v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), but not in all cases, see
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). The existence of an intermediate standard of review,
between strict and minimal scrutiny, was suggested in Gunther, In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer EqualProtection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I (1972). Essentially,
Gunther suggested that the Court should opt out of determining what is fundamental and what is
suspect, and instead scrutinize legislation solely to determine whether the means adopted substan-
tialy further an important purpose. The Court used this terminology in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976), regarding sex, and in Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), regard-
ing illegitimacy.
132. See generally text accompanying notes 66-75 supra.
133. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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solicitude is appropriate."'' 34 Invalidating a blanket restriction against
aliens receiving welfare, the Court could find nothing approaching a
compelling governmental interest in limiting welfare benefits to citi-
zens. 1
3 5
Two years later, the Court struck down two state laws, one barring
aliens from competing for permanent civil service positions, the other
preventing aliens from practicing law. In the former, Sugarman v. Dou-
gall,136 the Court could find neither a compelling nor rational interest
in closing all civil service positions to aliens, rejecting the contention
that aliens as a group were not sufficiently familiar with American
politics and practices to be effective civil servants. 137 In the latter, In re
Grifflths,13 8 the Court acknowledged the state's "undoubted interest" in
assuring high professional standards for attorneys. However, there ex-
isted ways to maintain such standards without a total ban on aliens
practicing law.
Dictum in Sugarman139 noted a potentially significant situation.
Certain important state responsibilities that are at the heart of the
American political community could theoretically provide a govern-
mental interest sufficiently compelling to justify a blanket ban on alien
participation. t4  However, in Groiths, decided the same day as
Sugarman, the Court rejected an attempt to label practicing law as one
of those important state responsibilities.14 1 Since the lawyer's function
in American society has come to bear a close substantive relationship to
134. Id. at 372.
135. Noting the existence of a special public interest doctrine prior to Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), which recognized that where the public interest demands, a
state may exclude aliens from certain activities, the Court argued that since aliens,
like citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed forces [and] may live within a
state for many years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of the
state. . . . [t]here can be no "special public interest" in tax revenues to which aliens have
contributed on an equal basis with the residents of the state.
403 U.S. at 376.
136. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
137. The decision, however, was a slight victory for aliens. The Court simply concluded that a
ban such as this, reaching "various positions in nearly the full range of work tasks, that is, all the
way from the menial to the policy-making," was too broad. Id. at 640. But see note 140 infra.
138. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
139. 413 U.S. at 640.
140. See note 137 supra. Justice Rehnquist's dissent is interesting. He stated that, given the
many constitutionally recognized distinctions between aliens and citizens, there is no "historical
evidence as to the intent of the Framers, which would suggest to the slightest degree that it was
intended to render alienage a 'suspect' classification, [or] that it was designed in any way to protect
'discrete and insular minorities' other than racial minorities .... " 413 U.S. at 650. However, in
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), Rehnquist accepted national origin as suspect, although
viewing alienage as different from national origin classifications. While a distinction exists be-
tween the two, the Court in Graham seemed to regard them as identical.
141. 413 U.S. at 720.
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the political community's existence, the Court's refusal to sanction a
ban on aliens practicing law seemed to indicate that "the right to vote
or to hold public office,"' 142 as political activities, might be the only
activities from which aliens as a class could be constitutionally barred.
The Right to Go vern Doctrine
The limited notion of citizen-only occupations that Sugarman and
Griffths suggested, as well as alienage's status as a suspect classifica-
tion, was short-lived. In Foley v. Connelie,143 the Court upheld a New
York law' 44 barring aliens from becoming members of the state police
force. Purporting to rely on the Sugarman dictum, 45 the Court rea-
soned that where certain matters "within a State's constitutional pre-
rogatives"' 46 were involved, 47 alienage classifications were not
suspect. 48 Since the right to govern is reserved to citizens, the state
could prohibit aliens from certain activities and occupations closely
linked to the governing process if there existed a rational reason for
doing SO. 149 In Foley, the Court found that the police function called
for a high degree of judgment and discretion that was basic to govern-
142. [W]e do not hold that, on the basis of an individualized determination, an alien may
not be refused, or discharged from, public employment, even on the basis of noncitizen-
ship, if the refusal to hire, or the discharge, rests on legitimate state interests that relate to
qualifications for a particular position or to the characteristics of the employee.
413 U.S. at 646-47 (emphasis supplied).
As it turned out, the words "individualized determination" did not mean a case-by-case anal-
ysis in which competent aliens were permitted to participate and incompetent aliens were elimi-
nated. Rather, they meant that in cases where the state had a legitimate reason for doing so, aliens
as a class could be barred. This bizarre dictum, referred to as the Sugarman dictum, suggests that
alienage is not suspect at all. See text accompanying notes 144-54 infra.
143. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
144. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 215(3) (McKinney 1972).
145. 413 U.S. at 646-47; see note 141 supra.
146. 435 U.S. at 297-300.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 296. "It would be inappropriate, however, to require every statutory exclusion of
aliens to clear the high hurdle of 'strict scrutiny,' because to do so would 'obliterate all the distinc-
tions between citizens and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values of citizenship.' " Id. at
295. However, labeling alienage as suspect forced the state to clear the high hurdle before it could
use such a classification because Graham eliminated all distinctions except those that were the
only method of achieving a compelling interest.
149. This is not because our society seeks to reserve the better jobs to its own members.
Rather, it is because this country entrusts many of its most important policy responsibili-
ties to these officers. . . . The essence of our holdings to date is that although we extend
to aliens the right to education and public welfare, along with the ability to earn a liveli-
hood and engage in licensed professions, the right to govern is reserved to citizens.
Id. at 296-97. This may be an accurate statement of what enlightened public policy ought to be.
It is a misstatement of the constitutional law in this area, however, which held that before a state
could exclude aliens from participating in an activity, the state had to prove that exclusion was the
only method by which its compelling interest could be achieved.
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ment. 50 Therefore, a state police officer's job "is one where citizenship
bears a rational relationship to the special demands of the particular
position,' 15' thus allowing a state to permissibly bar all aliens.
Foley was a definite blow to alienage's status as a suspect classifi-
cation and a clear departure from Sugarman and Griffiths. If citizen-
ship becomes relevant whenever an occupation involves judgment and
discretion, Griths was incorrectly decided. How can an alien possess
qualities necessary to be an officer of the court but not an officer of the
law? How can aliens be sufficiently trustworthy to defend the rights of
persons accused of crime yet not possess the judgment and discretion
needed to execute the laws? Graham labeled alienage as suspect pre-
cisely because classifications such as this are overinclusive. 52 Foley
permitted states to presume that citizens are "more familiar with and
sympathetic to American traditions,"'' 53 albeit this is the same type of
presumption that Sugarman and Grifths invalidated.
Foley appears to demonstrate the Court's unhappiness with
Sugarman, Griths, and perhaps even with Graham. Whether pur-
posefully or inadvertently, the Court in Foley misconstrued the
Sugarman dictum. If aliens can be uniformly barred from certain ac-
tivities under the suspect classification doctrine, it is only because the
state has a compelling interest for doing so. Doctrine becomes a non
sequitur when the Court holds that the doctrine only applies when in-
consequential things are involved. The doctrine's purpose is to prevent
government from basing its policies on unarticulable group characteris-
tics. In Foley, however, the Court permitted precisely that behavior by
the state when it decided that alienage is not suspect because the stakes
are high and because strict scrutiny might have yielded a result at vari-
ance with the state's policy preference. Perhaps New York's police eli-
gibility law could have passed both the compelling interest and
150. Id. at 298.
151. Id. at 300.
152. Assuming, arguendo, that the state's need for competent and loyal police officers is com-
pelling, there is nevertheless no logical basis for the presumption that all citizens will possess
better judgment and discretion, after training, than will all noncitizens. The state's true compel-
ling interest is in eliminating disloyal or incompetent applicants from its police force. Presumably,
the state has devised batteries of tests and procedures for background investigations that will shed
light on fitness and competence. Possession of citizenship would be expected to be among the
least reliable predictors of future performance. If alienage were not suspect, this expectation
would be irrelevant because, under minimal scrutiny, the state is not required to select the best or
even the most rational method of achieving a legitimate interest. However, alienage is suspect, so
that even though marginally relevant or irrelevant classifications may represent the state's best
guess as to who will be effective, they are simply not permissible.
153. 435 U.S. at 299-300.
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alternative means tests; nevertheless, it should have been subjected to
those tests or Graham should have been overruled.
The Court's assault on the suspect classification doctrine continued
in Ambach v. Norwick. 154 New York prohibited aliens who were eligi-
ble for citizenship but refused to be naturalized from becoming public
school teachers.1 55 The Court upheld the statute, citing Foley and ex-
tending Foley's conception of a variable suspect classification doc-
trine. 156 Since education is fundamentally important in a
democracy, 157 and since teachers, regardless of attempts at objectivity,
are important conduits of civic and social responsibility, teaching in a
public school is an endeavor that lies at the heart of our institutions.
Considered in this manner, teaching becomes the functional equivalent
of being a police officer, so that the state can bar all aliens as teachers
so long as it has a rational reason for doing so. The Court had little
difficulty in finding that the state's interest in furthering educational
achievement met the test of rationality, hence the ban on certain aliens
was clearly valid. 158
As in Foley, the use of the massively overinclusive classification is
not a particularly rational method of assuring competence and loyalty.
The Court does not explain why aliens in Grjiths were sufficiently
competent and loyal to deal with important individual rights, while in
Norwick aliens could be permissibly labeled as unable to teach and
154. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
155. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3001(3) (McKinney 1970).
156. 441 U.S. at 74. See generally discussion in text at notes 144-53 supra.
157. The Court's opinion went to some lengths in order to characterize education as funda-
mental and analyzed in minute detail how critically important education is in American society.
This is most curious, since the opinion is written by Justice Powell, who had gone to similar
lengths in his opinion for the Court in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973), see text accompanying notes 88-92 supra, endeavoring to counter the argument that
education was a fundamental right.
158. 441 U.S. at 80. "Appellees, and aliens similarly situated, in effect have chosen to classify
themselves. . . .They have rejected the open invitation extended to qualify for eligibility to teach
by applying for citizenship in this country." Id. at 80-81.
The dissent noted many of the difficulties with this decision. First, New York permits aliens
to teach under certain exigent circumstances, N.Y. EDouc. LAW § 3001(a) (McKinney 1978), per-
mits aliens to teach while they are waiting for citizenship (although they may never get it), id.
§ 3001(3), permits aliens to teach in private schools, id., which eighteen percent of the state's
students attend, and permits aliens to sit on school boards, id. § 2590-c(4).
In this regard, New York's education statutes are a crazy quilt of conflicting regulations that
probably fail to establish the rational basis requisite under minimal scrutiny. Second, the Court
sanctioned the state's fundamental principle that it is better to have a bad teacher who is a citizen
than a good teacher who is not. As with the policy in Foley, the "State will know how to select its
teachers responsibly, wholly apart from citizenship, and can do so selectively and intelligently.
That is the way to accomplish the desired result." 441 U.S. at 87-88 (Blackmun, J. dissenting); see
also note 152 supra. Finally, "it is logically impossible to differentiate between this case concern-
ing teachers and In Re Groffihs concerning attorneys." Id. at 88 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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explain those rights. 5 9 Norwick, like Foley, sanctioned abandoning
the suspect classification doctrine whenever an activity can be lumped
together under the meaningless heading of government function. 60
While the Court has recently recognized that a classification can be
variably suspect, depending on the reason for which it is used,' 6 1 there
is nothing variable about New York's motive in Foley and Norwick:
State action is motivated by state animus toward the group singled out
for disqualification. The Court's approval is a thinly veiled disap-
proval of alienage's status as suspect or, perhaps, disapproval of the
suspect classification doctrine itself.
CONCLUSION
Whatever difficulties may arise in interpreting the Burger Court's
philosophy in substantive areas such as debtors' rights, 62 voting, 163 and
state regulation of access to various professions, 164 the three crucial ar-
eas of state action, fundamental rights, and suspect classifications por-
tray a Court that is far from directionless in reversing the trend of
rights protected under the fourteenth amendment. There is a curious
egalitarianism to Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,165 Holt Civic Club v. City of
Tuscaloosa,166 Foley v. Connelie,167 and Ambach v. Norwick 6 8 which
strips certain interests or groups of the special judicial attention that
had previously been afforded. These decisions also represent a clear
159. "One may speak proudly of the role model of the teacher .... Are the attributes of an
attorney any the less?" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
160. Cases such as Sugarman, Griffiths, Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (aliens cannot
be barred from receiving state educational benefits), and Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572 (1976) (aliens cannot be barred from being licensed as engineers), seemed to hold that
alienage was suspect whenever it was used to deny earning a livelihood or sharing in government
benefits. See note 149 supra. Norwick contradicted this impression.
161. See, e.g., Regents of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), in which a majority of the
Court concluded that a suspect classification might be permissibly used if its use were not moti-
vated by animus toward the subject group. However, the sliding scale definition of suspect in
Foley and Norwick is quite different since some degree of animus was present in each. Probably
the most disturbing aspect of these two cases is that, after determining that strict scrutiny was not
appropriate, the Court used no scrutiny at all. Since it appears that the Court was aware that there
were rational reasons, but few compelling ones, for discriminating against aliens, it would have
been more intellectually honest for the Court to drop alienage as a suspect classification and sim-
ply apply minimal scrutiny. While it is unlikely that any of the pre-Foley cases would have been
decided differently under minimal scrutiny, it is nevertheless difficult to justify the holdings in
Foley and Norwick under any equal protection standard.
162. See generally discussion in text at notes 37-46 supra.
163. See generally discussion in text at notes 114-25 supra.
164. See generally discussion in text at notes 136-59 supra.
165. 436 U.S. 149 (1978); see discussion in text at 42-46 supra.
166. 439 U.S. 60 (1978); see discussion in text at notes 113-25 supra.
167. 435 U.S. 291 (1978); see discussion in text at notes 143-53 supra.
168. 441 U.S. 68 (1979); see discussion in text at notes 154-58 supra.
892 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
rejection of the recent judicial philosophy that these groups and inter-
ests need extra protection in order to enjoy equal protection. For better
or worse, the Court has returned much power to the states by seriously
diluting three of the most important procedural mechanisms designed
to protect civil rights.
